

[REDACTED]

1. On 29 October 1965 at 12:30 P.M., Mehdi Ben Barka, leader of the Moroccan opposition party, the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNPF) was kidnapped in front of a Paris restaurant, "Brasserie Lipp". Within two days, Paris and Arabic press speculation as to the reasons for the kidnapping and its perpetrators suggested possible CIA involvement. The sequence of newspaper articles concerning American involvement in the Ben Barka affair was as follows:

A. 3 November 1965. (Rabat, Morocco) Article in the Arabic daily Al Muharir, the leftist organ of the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNPF).

(1) The article comments upon the positions of the French, American and Moroccan Governments. Regarding the American Government position, the article states that Ben Barka's projected activities at Havana and elsewhere have not been favorably viewed by the American police. The

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Americans are known to have police representatives detailed for work in European countries. The American police often execute operations even without the knowledge of the American Government. It is also known that the American police provide important technical aid to the Moroccan police force in both Morocco and the United States as well as in other countries.

- B. 3 November 1965. (Paris, France) Le Monde. Commenting upon the Al Muharir article, Le Monde stated that the UNPF had referred to "imperialist secret service" involvement and obviously meant the United States because of "American preoccupation" with the Havana Conference and Ben Barka's role in the conference.
- C. 5 November 1965. (Paris, France) An article signed by Claire Barsal in the Gaullist weekly Notre Republique captioned "Are the U.S. Intelligence Services Implicated?"

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- (1) The article elaborated upon the above Al. Muharir article. It stated that from known facts, the kidnappers were members of an important net with considerable means. It stated further that they were identified as Europeans, and that North Americans therefore could not be excluded. The hypothesis of French police complicity was excluded as being obviously absurd. Therefore, two possibilities remained - Moroccan extremists or, more plausibly, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, possibly using French elements - such as former Secret Army Organization types.
- (2) The article repeated the unfavorable view of American authorities to Ben Barka's recent travels and contacts in Vietnam, China, Indonesia, and Japan. It also speculated that from the CIA point of view, Ben Barka's briefcase must have contained names and correspondence which

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constituted a "battery of bombs".

D. 10 November 1965. (Washington, D.C.) Washington Post.

- (1) The news item quoted a statement of Mohammed Bouabid, head of Moroccan UNPF to a Figaro correspondent: "The kidnapping has above all a strictly Moroccan political character. It is absurd to try to throw us off the scent by talking of an operation of the American CIA. The truth is that the object was to wreck a discussion that we had undertaken with King Hassan II with which Ben Barka was in agreement." The statement was not printed in Figaro.

E. 12 November 1965. (Paris, France) Minute.

(Scandal sheet, sensational, not particularly anti-U.S.)

- (1) Minute gave a long account of the origin of a plan to kill Ben Barka. The article alleged that both Hassan II and Interior Minister Oufkir wanted Ben Barka out of the way.

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Three Moroccans allegedly went to the French Intelligence Service, the Service de Documentation Exterieur et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE) for help. They were advised they could not be given assistance officially, but an SDECE officer to whom they talked (unidentified) suggested they could involve the Americans. They could do this by pointing out that the Moroccan Minister of Economy Laghzaoui is pro-American and Ben Barka's friendship with Fidel Castro is known, and obviously displeasing to the Americans. Therefore removal of Ben Barka could be represented as a CIA coup.

- (2) The article then described what happened - no further mention was made of American and CIA involvement. The item concluded that the long standing feud and struggle between Jacques Foccart (Elysee Secretary for Afro-Malagasy Affairs) and Interior Minister Roger Frey for control of the French police and intelligence services

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has been brought into the open.

F. 17 November 1965. (Paris, France) Canard Enchaîne.
(Liberal, anti-regime)

- (1) This article stated that CIA completely controls the Moroccan police and special services. Dlimi, Moroccan Director of Surete, was trained in a CIA school in Washington. The article identified Dlimi's advisor, Eleger, as a former Abwehr officer and refugee in Argentina in 1945, who returned to Germany and was arrested although not convicted. Eleger turned up later in Rabat as an American officer. The article also stated that Dlimi is advised by an American Major Gray (Special Services) and one Steihart (a Gehlen agent from Bonn).
- (2) The article further stated that CIA control of the Moroccan police and army is the basis for de Gaulle's annoyance with both Hassan II and Moroccan Interior Minister Oufkir.

G. 17-23 November 1965. (Paris, France) Le Nouvel Observateur. (Far left, anti-American)

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- (1) The article stated that de Gaulle upon hearing of the kidnapping, said, with annoyance, that it was a coup of the CIA.
- (2) The article made no further mention of Americans and gave a long expose of the case which definitely implicated the SDECE and French police.

H. 29 November 1965. (Paris, France) Le Nouveau Candide. (Pro-Gaullist, anti-American)

- (1) The article quoted from a "Jeune Afrique" article which stated that the abduction was not the work of France or Morocco, but of the United States. ("Jeune Afrique" is a slick-page publication which appeals primarily to young, Third World readers. It is considered influential and is known for its militant, often anti-American line. It has offices in Paris and Rome, and is considering establishing one in New York.)
- (2) The article cited four reasons Americans wanted to get rid of Ben Barka - his involvement in the Havana Conference; his

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disappearance on French soil would compromise French-Moroccan relations; Ben Barka's potential rise to power in Morocco would endanger American bases there; the timing of his disappearance during the French elections would embarrass de Gaulle.

- (3) This article introduced a second car into the kidnapping, allegedly driven by an American Air Force sergeant to an American airfield at Chateauroux. The article concluded by citing CIA involvement in the Bay of Pigs, Mossadegh, and the fall of the Souvanna Phouma Government in Laos (presumably in 1960) as evidence of previous CIA action without U.S. Government approval.
- (4) Finally it stated that the men who carried out the abduction probably came from a secret U.S. base in the Department of Landes which is the location of "the American base 313", and that CIA probably ran the operation from this base.

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2. When the involvement of the French Intelligence Service and the police in this case became evident in early November, President de Gaulle ordered Vice Admiral Jean Philippon of the Elysee Military Staff to conduct an investigation. Subsequent details of the kidnapping as revealed in the French press and witness testimony are as follows. Two Paris police officers, later identified as Louis Souchon and Roger Voitot, identified themselves to Ben Barka in front of the "Brasserie Lipp" and asked him to accompany them to a rendezvous. In a later statement to Juge d'Instruction Zollinger, Souchon stated he had been contacted by Antoine Lopez (Flight Director at Orly) who told him that his superior at the SDECE and Elysee Secretary-General for Afro-Malagasy Affairs Jacques Foccart were both "au courant" regarding the mission that Souchon and Voitot were about to perform. (Aurore - 16 January 1966) Aurore is rightist, anti-Gaullist.

3. Subsequently, Ben Barka was driven by Souchon, Voitot, and Lopez to a villa at Fontenay-le-Vicomte which is owned by Georges Boucheseiche, owner of a transient hotel

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in the rue Blondel, Paris. According to the testimony, later denied, of Georges August Figon (one of the men awaiting Ben Barka at the villa) Ben Barka was beaten to death there by four hired thugs, the final blows being delivered personally by Oufkir who came to the villa in response to a phone call. Moroccan Surete Chief, Dlimi, was also reportedly present.

4. As the involvement of the French police and the Intelligence Service in the case became increasingly obvious, the French press concentrated on the SDECE and on Jacques Foccart from the Elysee. It dropped any further mention of American or CIA interest without, naturally enough, retracting previous statements of U.S. complicity. In testimony reported in the Paris press, it developed that Lopez' superior at the SDECE was Marcel Le Roy (aka Finville). In Le Roy's testimony reported on 16 January, he admitted having been informed by Lopez of the planned kidnapping, three weeks before it happened. According to Lopez, Oufkir arranged the kidnapping. Le Roy also stated that he had informed

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SDECE Chief, General Jacquier, on 31 October of the details of the French and Moroccan involvement in the kidnapping.

5. French officials now involved, by the statements of the two policemen (Souchon and Voitot) and by subsequent statements of Figon and Le Roy, as having some knowledge of the affair, or as having directly participated are:

- A. Jacques Foccart (Secretary-General at the Elysee for Afro-Malagasy Affairs)
- B. Jacques Aubert (Director of Cabinet of Minister of Interior Frey)
- C. Marcel Le Roy (aka Donald, Finville, etc.) SDECE officer, and chief to Antoine Lopez
- D. Antoine Lopez (Flight Director at Orly, working for the SDECE and Le Roy. Lopez is currently under arrest)
- E. Jean Fernet (Director of the Police Judicaire of the Paris Prefecture of Police)
- F. Commissioner Andre Simbille (Deputy Director of the Police Judicaire, PP)

6. In addition, five vagrants have been identified as having been involved in the affair. These men are Georges Boucheseiche, Pierre Dubail, Julien Le Ny, Jean Palisse and Georges Figon. Some have had various shady past connections with the Secret Army Organization, others have been labelled as Moroccan thugs.

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7. Georges Figon reportedly committed suicide in his Paris apartment on 17 January 1966.

8. According to a Reuters 18 January 1966 report, Le Roy was suspended as of that date.

9. Radio news reports on 19 January 1966 indicate that a government spokesman announced that General Jacquier, Chief of the SDECE, was fired from his post following a meeting of the French Cabinet on 19 January 1966. The spokesman also announced that the SDECE, which was formerly attached to the office of the Prime Minister, would now be placed directly under the Armed Forces Minister.

10. The French news service, Agence France Press, has just announced that Major General Guibaud has been named to replace General Jacquier. There is no further information immediately available on General Guibaud.